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abstract
The aim of this paper is to offer a map of the dynamics through which pornography may silence women’s 
illocutions. Drawing on Searle’s speech act theory, I will take illocutionary forces as sets of conditions 
for success. The different types of silencing, I claim, originate from the hearer’s missed recognition of 
a specific component of the force of the speaker’s act. In addition to the varieties already discussed in 
literature (which I label essential, authority, and sincerity silencing), I shall finally consider another 
kind of silencing produced by the failure to acknowledge the speaker’s words as serious (seriousness 
silencing).
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Catharine MacKinnon (1987, 1993) has contended that pornography silences women by 
violating their freedom of speech1. Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (H&L) (Hornsby 1993; 
Langton 1993; Hornsby & Langton 1998) have defended the plausibility of this claim by 
drawing on Austin’s speech act theory. Pornography, H&L argue, spreads false beliefs and 
expectations about women (i.e., about what they are, what they desire, how they behave in 
sexual contexts) that interfere with men’s capacity to grasp the illocutionary force of certain 
acts women attempt to perform, thereby causing them to misfire. Silencing, in this frame, is a 
form of uptake failure. 
Besides H&L’s proposal, other accounts of silencing have recently been provided. As a result, 
the notion of ‘silencing’ has become richer but also more elusive. This paper surveys the major 
conceptions of silencing involved in the debate on the phenomenon. The aim is to offer a map 
of the ways in which speech – especially women’s speech2 – can be silenced. The discussion 
focuses on the act of sexual refusal. However, the kinds of silencing I will consider may hinder 
the performance of other sorts of acts as well. Moreover, though the most interesting views on 
silencing have been developed in debating the harms of pornography, all varieties of silencing 
may be brought about3 by sources other than pornography too (e.g., racist speech). Unlike 
others who have dealt with silencing, I shall adopt the Searlian framework, which seems better 
suited to describe the dynamics through which speakers can be silenced, thanks to its high 
level of accuracy4. According to Searle, every illocutionary force can be identified by a set of 
1  MacKinnon’s allegation narrows its scope to a specific subset of pornographic material intended for a heterosexual 
male audience and constituted by depictions of women dehumanized as sexual objects and shown as enjoying pain, 
humiliation or rape. Hereafter, I will use the term ‘pornography’ to refer to just this subset.
2  Women are the (silenced) speakers I will look at since my discussion focuses on the (silenced) act of sexual refusal. 
Nevertheless, the types of silencing I examine here may affect other “disempowered speakers” (Hornsby 1995) as well, 
as they are likely to occur whenever the distribution of power is strikingly unjust.
3  While Hornsby (1993, 2014) suggests that pornography causes silencing, Langton (1993) claims that it constitutes 
silencing. I shall remain neutral on whether or not pornography constitutes (rather than merely causes) silencing, 
since the differences between the two accounts are not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
4  The silencing claim against pornography (especially its “constitutive” version) is highly controversial. As most 
difficulties raised by critics depend on the Austinian setting endorsed by its supporters, adopting Searle’s alternative 
paradigm may be a good move for eluding (some of) them. In particular, Searle’s framework offers some insights to 
solve the “Authority Problem” (think to the distinction between power and authority outlined in Searle & Vanderveken 
1985: ch. 9). Since the issue falls outside the scope of this paper, I leave the assessment of this hypothesis for another 
occasion. (For a discussion of the Authority Problem, see Maitra 2012).
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conditions for success. In recent literature, we find three main forms of silencing. All of them, I 
claim, originate from the hearer’s failed recognition of a specific component of the force of the 
speaker’s act. 
The plan of the paper is the following. After outlining the key features of Searle’s analysis of 
illocutionary force (Section 2), I examine through the Searlian lens four types of silencing 
(Section 3). Firstly, I discuss what I label essential silencing, which involves the audience’s failure 
to recognize the illocutionary point of the speaker’s act. It corresponds to H&L silencing 
(Section 3.1). Secondly, I take into account a type of silencing occurring when the hearer fails 
to ratify the speaker’s authority over a relevant domain (authority silencing). Similar sorts of 
silencing have been discussed by Mary Kate McGowan (2009) and Marina Sbisà (2009) (Section 
3.2). Later on, I consider the so-called sincerity silencing (McGowan 2014), which occurs when 
the speaker’s utterance is mistakenly taken as insincere (Section 3.3). In addition to these 
varieties, I then discuss a form of silencing produced by the failure to acknowledge the 
speaker’s words as serious (seriousness silencing) (Section 3.4)5. Finally, I argue that all these 
types of silencing are genuine instances of illocutionary disablement, albeit at first glance it 
might not seem so (Section 4).
As Austin has pointed out, saying something is eo ipso doing something. In speaking, we not 
only utter meaningful expressions (i.e., perform locutionary acts), but we perform illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts too. Illocutionary acts correspond to the actions the speaker performs 
in uttering certain words, or to put it another way, to the peculiar force of the locution in 
the context of utterance (e.g., in saying “Leave him!” the speaker urged the hearer to leave 
him), whereas perlocutionary acts correspond to the effects brought about on the addressee’s 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (e.g., by saying “Leave him!” the speaker persuaded the 
hearer to leave him). As is known, illocution is the core of the speech act theory. Every use 
of language has indeed a performative dimension enshrined in its illocutionary force, which 
turns the uttering of a sentence in the performing of an action.
In attempting to formalize and deepen the notion of ‘illocutionary force’, Searle & 
Vanderveken (1985) have defined it as a set of seven success conditions6. Every septuple has 
the following components: (i) illocutionary point (the aim an act has in virtue of being an act 
of a certain kind)7, (ii) degree of strength of the illocutionary point (e.g., differences such as that 
between asserting and insisting), (iii) mode of achievement (the peculiar way in which the 
illocutionary point must be pursued), (iv) propositional content conditions (restrictions imposed 
on the utterance’s content), (v) preparatory conditions (states of affairs that must obtain in the 
world of utterance), (vi) sincerity conditions (the psychological state(s) the speaker must have in 
order to perform a sincere act), (vii) degree of strength of the sincerity conditions (e.g., differences 
such as that between requesting and beseeching).
On my account, illocutionary silencing (in general) is a speech act failure constituted by the 
systematic and unjust misrecognition by the audience of a specific component of the force 
of the speaker’s act. The term ‘misrecognition’, as I use it, means simply ‘missed (or failed) 
recognition’ (and not ‘misinterpretation’ or ‘wrong recognition’). Such misrecognition 
constitutes (some sort of) silencing only if it takes place in a (i) systematic and (ii) unjust 
manner – that is, only if (i) it is brought about by highly widespread beliefs about a certain 
5  In Section 3.4, I give some reasons why non-seriousness does not conflate with insincerity. 
6  A similar definition had already been proposed by Searle (1975: 346).
7  Illocutionary point corresponds to the essential condition stated in Searle (1969: 63), which requires that the speaker 
intend her utterance as the performing of a specific (type of) act.
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target group (it is not idiosyncratic), and (ii) it occurs just because the speaker is a member 
of that group (regardless of what she says and of how she says it). In what follows, I will 
concentrate on sexual refusals. The misrecognition will involve the illocutionary point of 
women’s intended refusals, their status or position (which represents a crucial preparatory 
condition for refusing), and the sincerity of their words.
Before getting to the heart of the matter, let me address a preliminary question. As said above, 
locutionary acts are not the only kind of act we perform with words. With this in mind and 
following Langton (1993), we can enrich our intuitive notion of ‘silencing’ by analysing it along 
the speech levels introduced by Austin. The question to clarify is how someone’s actions or 
words may silence the voice of someone else. First of all, one may literally shut someone else 
up by means of physical coercion (e.g., gagging her), psychological violence (e.g., threatening 
her), or institutional norms (e.g., issuing legal restrictions on freedom of speech) (locutionary 
silence). Second, one may recognize but disregard someone’s speech acts, so as to prevent her 
from obtaining her perlocutionary goals (perlocutionary frustration). Finally, one may deprive 
someone else’s words of illocutionary potential by fostering a hostile communicative climate 
that interfere with the hearer’s recognition of (certain components of) the force of the 
speaker’s act, so that to cause its misfiring (illocutionary disablement). The silencing argument 
against pornography – as presented by H&L – involves the latter sense of silencing. When H&L 
argue that pornography silences women, they mean that it deprives women of illocutionary 
potential thereby preventing them from doing certain things with words – e.g., refusing sexual 
advances. Pornography may silence women’s illocutions through different mechanisms. It is 
time to examine them in detail, starting from the mechanism of uptake failure which gives 
place to what I label essential silencing.
Let’s imagine the following scenario. A man approaches a woman for sex. She attempts to 
refuse it by saying “No”. The man does not care and goes ahead forcing sex on her. According 
to H&L, the failure of the woman’s refusal can be due to the missed acknowledgement by 
the man of her illocutionary intention. The key element here is uptake (i.e., the hearer’s 
recognition of the meaning and the force of the locution), which H&L treat as a necessary 
condition for illocution. If uptake is not achieved, then the woman’s “No” cannot count as 
a refusal. Her act is unavoidably null, it does not take effect. How can pornography prevent 
women from achieving uptake? The answer provided is the following. Many pornographic 
stories include “favourable” rape depictions – that is, they represent reluctant women who 
give in to sexual pleasure upon being raped. Some presuppositions are obviously required for 
making sense of depictions like these. For instance, women enjoy violent sex, women fantasize 
about rape, women’s utterance of “No” is part of the game (Langton & West 1999). The result is 
that some consumers of pornography may come to believe that, in saying “No”, women do not 
intend to refuse – and this explains why women’s acts are not recognized as they are meant to 
be taken.
Recasting H&L’s proposal in Searlian terms, silencing can be conceived as a speech act failure 
constituted by the (systematic and unjust) misrecognition of the illocutionary point of the 
speaker’s act. Due to some interfering factor, the addressee misses to acknowledge that the 
speaker’s act meets its essential condition. 
Before going any further, notice that H&L’s view can be construed in (at least) two ways: (i) 
in some relevant contexts, a woman’s “No” does not count as a refusal; (ii) in some relevant 
contexts, a woman’s “No” counts as a consent. On the first reading, silencing originates 
from the failed recognition of the illocutionary point of the speaker’s act. On the second, by 
contrast, it results from the hearer’s ascription of a reversed illocutionary point to the act the 
3. Four Types of 
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speaker is attempting to perform. On the one hand, pornography brings about illocutionary 
disablement; on the other, it brings about illocutionary distortion as well8. The latter reading 
has been proposed by Nellie Wieland (2007), who has suggested that, in H&L’s account, 
pornography is convention-setting for it makes it the case that, in real-life sexual encounters, 
the expression “No” comes to mean yes. But if it is correct that pornography enacts such a 
linguistic convention, then men are right in interpreting women’s “No” as consent moves. 
This gives rise to a highly undesired consequence: if the man has obtained his victim’s consent, 
then he is no longer a rapist (Wieland 2007: 452-453). To avoid this problem, we may buy into 
the first of the above mentioned readings (Maitra & McGowan 2010). In so doing, however, 
we would be faced with a question: if the man’s uptake of the woman’s “No” is neither one 
of refusal nor one of consent, what kind of act does he attribute to her? The most plausible 
answer is none. In saying what she says, the woman is doing nothing but play-acting. If so, 
essential silencing comes to overlap with seriousness silencing (see Section 3.4).
McGowan (2009) identifies an alternative type of illocutionary silencing. On her account, 
refusals are authoritative speech acts: they require that the speaker have authority in the right 
domain. To see how authoritative speech works, imagine that a private tries to command a 
general to open fire against the enemy. Even if the general grasps the illocutionary point of 
the private’s putative act (i.e., he grasps his intention to command), the private nevertheless 
fails to illocute since he lacks the required authority. Sexual refusals, McGowan claims, are 
more similar to commands than to assertions as they can be performed only by speakers who 
have authority over their own bodies. Although every woman has this kind of authority simply 
in virtue of being a person, some men may fail to recognize it. Indeed, since the peculiar 
kind of pornography we are referring to presents women as mere tools to meet male sexual 
desire, its habitual consumers may come to regard them as having no authority whatsoever9. 
In depicting women in postures of sexual submission, pornography transmits the idea that 
women do not have rights over their own bodies, but men do – thereby making it impossible 
for them to exercise certain forms of practical authority10.
Let’s look at this type of silencing through the Searlian lens. As I have said, it involves the 
addressee’s failure to ratify the speaker’s authority. That is, while grasping the illocutionary 
point of the speaker’s act, the recipient misrecognizes the obtaining of a crucial preparatory 
condition for refusals.
This form of silencing – as McGowan (2009: 493) acknowledges – does not appear to be 
a free speech issue. Whether or not it is the case turns on the more general question of 
what the right to free speech entails. I cannot fully address this question here, but, for my 
present aims, it may suffice to say that, in protecting freedom of speech, liberals (quite 
uncontroversially) want to protect speakers’ freedom to communicate ideas and opinions 
to others – and the right to be free from systematic communicative interference seems to 
be constitutive of the “freedom to communicate ideas”11. On this view, essential silencing 
impinges on freedom of speech (the woman’s “No” does not mean no to the hearer – that 
is, it fails to communicate the idea of refusal at all), while authority silencing does not, for it 
8  The notion of ‘illocutionary distortion’ is borrowed from Green (2016), though I use it in a slightly different sense, 
meaning only those cases in which a speaker’s utterance is given a reversed uptake.
9  McGowan’s account develops some ideas outlined by Langton. See, for example, Langton (1993: 325: «A woman who 
prohibits sexual advances […] has authority within the local domain of her own life, her own body […]. If pornography 
prevents her from refusing, then pornography destroys her authority»). 
10  Sbisà (2009) comes independently to analogous conclusions.
11  For a full discussion of what the right to free speech implies see West (2003).
3.2. Authority 
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involves no communicative breakdown (what the speaker says is indeed understood as it is 
meant to be taken). 
Because of certain beliefs spread by pornography, when women refuse sex they might be 
systematically taken as insincere. The relevant beliefs may include women always want sex or 
women tend to be coy so as not to appear promiscuous. In order to account for this possibility (and 
developing an idea already put forth by Hornsby [1993: 42]), McGowan (2014) has introduced 
the notion of ‘sincerity silencing’. In addition to illocutionary intentions concerning what kind 
of act one intends to perform, speakers also have sincerity intentions concerning the sincerity 
degree of their illocutions. Consequently, besides H&L silencing (essential silencing), there 
might be another type of silencing occurring when the addressee, while understanding the 
speaker’s illocutionary intention, mistakenly believes that she is acting insincerely.
Adopting Searle’s framework, we could regard sincerity silencing as resulting from the hearer’s 
misrecognition that the speaker’s act meets the sincerity condition. Since in refusing sex the 
speaker expresses both a desire (to deter the hearer from having sex with her) and an intention (not 
to have sex with him), a sexual refusal is (sincerely) silenced when the hearer fails to take both the 
desire and the intention the speaker manifests with her “No” as psychological states she truly has. 
Notice that, in McGowan’s (2014: 466) view, the audience’s acknowledgment of the speaker’s 
sincerity is necessary for successful communication. She argues for this thesis as follows. 
When a speaker performs a speech act, she usually pragmatically presupposes her own 
sincerity. If the recipient fails to grasp that presupposition, the speaker will succeed in 
communicating only part of what she is trying to get across. This means that sincerity silencing 
is a (partial) communicative failure, and thus constitutes a free speech violation. McGowan’s 
argument appears to me not wholly convincing. Firstly, it is not clear why in performing an 
authoritative speech act – as refusals are – the speaker presupposes her own sincerity, but not 
her own authority (as McGowan herself implies by arguing that sincerity silencing is a violation 
of freedom of speech, whereas authority silencing is not). Secondly, partial communicative 
failure is, in a sense, unavoidable (it is extremely rare that addressees succeed in grasping all 
allusions or subtle implicatures of speakers’ utterances), and this seems a good reason to deny 
its constituting a free speech infringement. McGowan (ibid.) is aware of this difficulty and 
tries to meet it by arguing that not everything a speaker intends to communicate is on a par. 
When the addressee fails to recognize nuances of allusions or implicatures, such a failure is not 
troubling. But, when a sexual refusal is mistakenly taken as insincere, the addressee’s failure 
undermines the entire point of refusing (i.e., to stop sexual advances). However, distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant implicit contents is not at all that easy, for the “degree of 
relevance” depends not only on the type of act performed but also on the context of utterance. 
Think to the act of refusal: when it is performed in the context of unwanted sex, the “sincerity 
presupposition” appears to be communicatively fundamental, but when it is performed in the 
context of, say, unwanted food, the same presupposition is much less important. In the light of 
these considerations, I do not regard sincerity silencing as a free speech impingement. Sincerity 
silencing, like authority silencing, does not involve any communicative failure: the woman’s “No” 
does mean no to the hearer, even though it is systematically acknowledged as insincere. 
3.3. Sincerity 
Silencing
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According to Langton (1993: 321), the woman who is silenced in the sense of (what I have 
called) essential silencing is like the actor on the stage, who, after shouting for fire as part of 
the play, tries vainly to warn the audience of a real fire12. Unlike Langton, I prefer to save 
the distinction between the two accounts, since they are not equivalent. In the “essential” 
account, the hearer misses the illocutionary point of the speaker’s act, but seems to recognize 
that she is illocuting. On the contrary, in the “play-acting” account, the hearer takes the 
speaker as performing a non-serious act – that is, as not illocuting. Moreover, although play-
acting has something in common with insincerity (in both cases, the speaker is in a sense 
pretending), seriousness silencing does not conflate with sincerity silencing. While a non-sincere 
refusal (like a non-sincere promise) is still a refusal (or a promise), a play-acted refusal is not 
at all an illocutionary act, since it neither makes the speaker responsible for the performed act 
nor constitutes an attempt to carry out the perlocutionary object of the play-acted illocution13. 
Since speech act theorists consider seriousness as a background condition for illocution14, 
we could regard seriousness silencing as resulting from the hearer’s misrecognition that 
the speaker’s utterance meets a fundamental precondition for illocuting15. Due to the rules 
pornography contributes to make valid in sexual contexts, men falsely believe that a woman’s 
“No” is nothing but a line in a script, a move in the “game of sex” meant to increase her 
partner’s arousal. Since the speaker’s words are stricto sensu meaningless to the hearer, this 
form of silencing may properly amount to a free speech infringement. 
Before folding our map, it is worth stressing that, although the above kinds of silencing 
involve only three of the seven components of the illocutionary force (i.e., illocutionary 
point, preparatory conditions, and sincerity conditions), other forms of silencing may result 
from the misrecognition of the components of the force left over16. Consider Rebecca Kukla’s 
(2014: 445-446) example of the female boss, who tells her male workers what to do but is 
very often disobeyed. The low obedience rate can be accounted for in different manners. 
One possible explanation is that, because of her gender, the workers take her utterances as 
requests rather than orders. According to Searle & Vanderveken (1985: 201), orders diverge 
from requests since they have a different mode of achievement. While requests leave the 
addressee free to refuse, to order somebody to do something is to direct her in a manner 
which does not leave that possibility open. If the boss’ orders are systematically heard (and 
responded to) as requests, her disablement is due to the hearers’ misrecognition of the mode 
of achievement of her acts. In spite of understanding the illocutionary point of the boss’ 
utterances (i.e., to get them to do something), the workers fail to recognize that her words 
do not give them the option of refusing; consequently, they feel free not to do what she tells 
them to do.
12  The example is from Davidson (1984: 269).
13  While Sbisà (2009: 353) takes the “play-acting” account as an instance of perlocutionary frustration, I see it as a 
proper form of illocutionary disablement (see Section 4 for discussion).
14  Austin (1962: 22); Searle (1969: 57).
15  Seriousness could also be understood as a preparatory condition for every illocutionary act. The dynamics 
producing seriousness silencing, so construed, would be analogous to those producing authority silencing.
16  This is one of the advantages of adopting Searle’s conception of illocutionary force: it provides some insights in 
order to identify further types of silencing not yet considered in the debate on the phenomenon.
3.4. Seriousness 
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As should be clear at this point, illocutionary silencing is a multifaceted phenomenon. By 
adopting Searle’s framework, I have tried to integrate its diverse facets into a unique model. 
However, somebody may contend that not all types of silencing we have seen are instances 
of illocutionary disablement, since some but not all cause the speaker’s act to misfire. In this 
section, I will try to see which kinds of silencing have the power to nullify the speaker’s act 
and which kinds lack such a power. 
According to Searle, every attempt to perform an illocutionary act can be (i) fully successful 
(when all conditions for success are met), (ii) successful though defective (when some non-
necessary or additional conditions do not obtain), (iii) unsuccessful (when some necessary 
conditions are not satisfied). In both Austin’s and Searle’s theories, the successful securing of 
uptake figures among the necessary conditions for illocution17. It follows that essential silencing 
– which has been defined in terms of uptake failure – has the power to make the speaker’s 
act null, and therefore falls fully into the category of ‘illocutionary disablement’. Analogous 
remarks are relevant to seriousness silencing. In order to constitute some sort of illocutionary 
act an utterance has to be serious, and (crucially) it must be recognized as such. Why? Because 
the recognition of the speaker’s seriousness bears on uptake: if the hearer fails to acknowledge 
the utterance as serious the whole act is given no uptake at all. There is an easy (but misguided) 
objection to my last statement, which could be put this way: seriousness silencing does involve 
some sort of uptake for the hearer understands the utterance as a specific fictional act – e.g., as 
a fictional act of refusing sex (and not, say, consenting to it). This objection can be addressed 
by regarding fictional acts as simulated speech acts, which have a pretended force and achieve a 
fake uptake. Suppose that an actor on the stage, declaiming the last line of a monologue, says 
“There goes my life. Tonight I’ll commit suicide”. Though the audience understands the actor’s 
utterance as having the (pretended) force of a prediction, nobody would ascribe him the 
performance of that illocution (even in the case, in declaiming those words, the actor meant 
to make a real prediction). Because of the context, the actor’s words are given no true uptake. 
Similarly, although the man understands the woman’s “No” as having the (pretended) force 
of a refusal, because of the context (and the rules that govern conversation in that context), her 
utterance does not secure any true uptake – and this is why her act ends up misfiring. 
Authority and sincerity silencing are a somewhat different story. Let’s start from sincerity 
silencing. As it is clear, the speaker’s sincerity is not necessary for illocuting (it is always 
possible to perform an insincere speech act by expressing a psychological state one does 
not have), nor (a fortiori) is its recognition. Similar considerations apply to authority silencing. 
Even though the speaker’s authority is a necessary condition for refusing, the hearer’s 
recognition of that authority seems to be non-necessary or additional. (Since the man is 
wrong in regarding the woman as lacking the required authority, her “No” does count as a 
refusal)18. Apparently, authority and sincerity silencing fall into the category of ‘perlocutionary 
frustration’: the speaker whose authority or sincerity is denied is precluded from achieving 
by her words the intended effects on her audience. However, I take them as genuine instances 
of illocutionary disablement, in that they systematically (and unjustly) make the speaker’s 
act unsuited even to invite the appropriate response on the part of the hearer. In the case of 
sexual refusals, the woman’s “No” should invite the man to stop sexual advances (n.b., this does 
17  Austin (1962: 115-116); Searle (1969: 47).
18  The metaphysics of authority is a contentious issue. Somebody may claim, for instance, that having authority 
largely amounts to being recognized as having it and that authority is nothing but a social construction. On this way 
of thinking, if women are socially denied jurisdiction over their own bodies, then they do lack it. However, if at least 
some social agents (e.g., women themselves) acknowledge women’s authority to refuse sex, then gender prejudice 
cannot have the final say. I thank Tasneem Alsayyed for raising this point. See also Sbisà (2009: 355-356).
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not imply that her “No” should achieve that effect)19. If he does not even consider that she has 
refused (that is, if the woman’s utterance cannot invite its conventional response), the flaw is 
illocutionary (even if she succeeds in performing the act in question).
Despite their being more or less powerful, all the discussed kinds of silencing are forms of 
illocutionary disablement. If pornography silences women by undermining their ability 
to illocute rather than by merely causing their perlocutionary frustration, then it harms 
women in a particularly pernicious way. Perlocutionary acts (as opposed to illocutionary 
acts) are not under the speaker’s full control, but rather related to the peculiar context of 
utterance as well as to the audience the speaker is addressing. A speaker may try to produce 
some perlocutionary effects without succeeding, or may not intend to achieve a certain 
sequel which occurs nonetheless. As troubling perlocutionary frustration is (especially 
when it gives rise to rape), it does not impair the very ability of the speaker to do things 
with words. Rather, it increases the degree of uncertainty implied in each and every 
performance of a perlocutionary act. On the contrary, the speaker whose words are divested 
of illocutionary potential is impeded in doing what – under fair circumstances – she would 
have been able to do simply by being heard as doing it. Illocutionary silencing causes the 
speaker’s acts to be null or heavily defective without there being any reason for the failure 
but the speaker is a member of a disempowered social group, and thus constitutes an insidious 
form of discursive injustice20.
In this paper I have tried to sketch a map of the main kinds of illocutionary silencing discussed 
in recent philosophical literature. By looking at the debate on the harms of pornography, I 
have identified four types of silencing (essential, authority, sincerity, and seriousness silencing), 
which in turn have been analysed in the frame of a unique model based on Searle’s definition 
of ‘illocutionary force’ as a set of conditions for success. In the light of this definition, 
illocutionary silencing has been regarded as a speech act failure constituted by the systematic 
and unjust misrecognition on the part of the hearer of a specific component of the force of the 
speaker’s act. It emerged from my analysis that neither authority nor sincerity silencing amounts 
to a free speech infringement, since they do not involve any communicative failure. Thus, 
they cannot be employed in support of MacKinnon’s claim that pornography violates women’s 
freedom of speech. In conclusion, I have argued that, despite reasonable hesitation, all the 
discussed kinds of silencing are genuine instances of illocutionary disablement, and thereby 
constitute pernicious forms of discursive injustice21.
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